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Parental involvement in matchmaking may distort the 
choice of spouse because parents are willing to substitute 
love for market and household production, which are more 
sharable between parents and their children. This paper finds 
supportive evidence in a survey of Chinese couples. In both 
rural and urban areas, parent matchmaking is associated 
with less marital harmony between the couple, more sub-
missive wives, and a stronger belief in old age support for the 
son. In contrast, its association with couple income differs 
by rural and urban regions, perhaps because of differences 
in earning opportunities and in the enforcement of the one-
child policy. Moreover, parent matchmaking is associated 
with more children for the couple and lower schooling for 
wives only in rural areas. Thus, in places with a stronger 
need for old age support, parents tend to be involved in 
matchmaking and use it to select submissive daughters-in-
law to ensure old age support. The results render support 
to Becker, Murphy and Spenckuch (2015), who imply 
that parents would meddle with children’s preferences to 
ensure their commitment to providing old age support. 
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1 Introduction
Since the pioneering work on marriage of Becker (1973, 1974), marriage formation is often
modeled as a matching process similar to labor market matching between workers and ﬁrms,
where males and females meet each other randomly or are assisted by commercial agents
(Weiss, 1997). This approach ignores a unique feature of marriage matching: marriage is
not simply two individuals forming a new family; rather, it directly aﬀects the welfare of
their parents. An example of parental welfare being aﬀected is old age support. Throughout
history and still so in many developing countries today, old age support depends critically
on children (Cheung 1972; Davidson and Ekelund 1997; Anderson 2003). How do parents
ensure that old age support will be provided by children after they grow up? An interesting
answer is provided by Becker, Murphy and Spenkuch (2015) (BMS (2015) hereafter), who
argue that when old age support is mainly provided by adult children, parents will put in
resources to meddle with children's preferences (i.e., to make them more altruistic) to ensure
their commitment to providing old age support.
In this paper we examine how considerations of old age support shape marriage outcomes
when marriages are matched by parents. We argue that parental matchmaking involves a
tradeoﬀ between children's welfare and parents' welfare. Parents that help matchmaking have
a long-term relationship with the couple after the matching is done; such future interactions
may distort incentives in the matching process and therefore aﬀect matching outcomes.
In particular, consider a son that chooses between self and parental match. His satisfaction
with his spouse depends on expected marriage outcomes, including the couple's joint income,
household production (such as home-provided old age support and the number of children),
and the love between him and his future wife. From the parents' perspectives, they obtain a
spillover from the couple's income, enjoy direct household production including the care and
services provided in house by the couple (and especially from the wife) when they are old
(BMS, 2015). Being altruistic, parents may also obtain an altruistic component originated
from the son's welfare from the marriage.
Conﬂict of interest arises from the parents' keen interest in the couple's joint income and
household production including old age support. Parents who expect to receive ﬁnancial,
emotional and old age support from their son after his marriage may care less about how
attractive his wife is to him but more about how able she is in contributing to family income,
wealth and/or old age support via household production (Cheung 1972). Parents may also
care more about the compatibility of the daughter-in-law's preference with their needs for
old age support. In other words, parents weigh their harmony with the daughter-in-law more
heavily than the harmony between the future couple. As a result, the best wife candidate
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in the eyes of parents likely diﬀers from what is optimal to the son, even though parents are
altruistic and care about the son's welfare. Thus, parent matchmaking carries an agency
cost for the son, while it is at the same time a key instrument to ensure parental welfare as
parents grow old.
Without search costs, the son would prefer self search to avoid the agency cost in parental
matchmaking. However, parents and children diﬀer in search costs. On one hand, parents
may face higher search costs for love between the potential couple than the son. On the other
hand, parents can have a wide access to potential candidates via their social networks. For
instance, in places where parents are linked to a larger social network, search costs would be
lower in parental matchmaking than in children's self search. Parental search can represent
a greater advantage if parents are better at judging the candidate's character and earning
ability. Thus, despite parental matching's agency cost, it sometimes could be optimal for
the son to choose parental matchmaking because of the saving in search costs.
Other important reasons for parental matchmaking are culture, tradition and social sup-
port for the elderly. Throughout Chinese history (up to the early third of the 20th century),
Chinese parents had a long tradition of parental control rights in children (Cheung, 1972).1
In a traditional Chinese family, parents have authority over children even after they grow up,
and they arrange children's marriages with some help from professional matchmakers. Thus,
love marriage was an exception rather than the norm. Dramatic changes have occurred in
the past century. Now in both urban and rural China, love marriage has become the norm.
However, tradition still plays a powerful role, especially in rural China. Furthermore, only
in the last ten years or so, rural households began to gain access to state-provided pension
and health insurance. Adult children thus had been their primary source of old age support.
The traditional norms, as well as the slow catch up of public support, help to explain why
some parents still interfere heavily in the life of their adult children, and why ﬁlial piety (i.e.,
being respectful and obedient to parents) is still the key value in the Chinese family systems.
We incorporate both agency costs and search costs into a theoretical framework, and
derive several testable implications. First, we predict that the love in a marriage should
be lower for parents-involved matches than for self-matches. This is because parents value
more than their son the monetary and household production components of his marriage,
and they have a higher marginal cost in assessing love between their son and a potential
daughter-in-law. Due to the agency cost, the overall marriage gain to the son, measured
by love, income and household production but excluding search cost, would be lower under
1This paragraph draws from Cheung (1972), which provides an intuitive, comprehensive, and entertaining
explanations of many traditional family institutions such as parental ownership of children, blind marriage,
daughter-in-law raised from childhood, dowery, and so on.
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parents-involved matches than self matches. However, the sharable part of the marriage
outcome could be lower or higher under parental matchmaking. It would be higher because
parents put more emphasis on sharable market and household production than on love, and
therefore the wife that is picked by parents tends to have a higher ability to contribute to
the sharable productions. It could be lower when parents over-emphasize goods produced
within the household and the preservation of old social structure at the expense of market
productivity. In this case, the couple's income can be lower in parents-involved matches, but
key inputs (or traits) for household production such as the number of children, willingness
to provide old age support, and the submissiveness of the wife would increase.
Following BMS (2015), we further discuss how the need of old age support shapes the
eﬀect of parental matchmaking on marriage outcomes. For ﬁnancially constrained parents
who have to rely on their children for old age support, it is diﬃcult to commit adult children
to providing old age support. One way to obtain the commitment is parental investment in
shaping children's preferences (when they are young) so that they are more altruistic toward
parents;2 as a result, parents get more old age support, which in turn motivates parents
to invest optimally on children's human capital. Though BMS (2015) deal only with the
preference of the son (in our context), their basic idea can be readily applied to the situation
of parent matchmaking, which can be another instrument to meddle with children's (or
children-in-law's) preferences. Although it is largely impossible to change the preference of a
daughter-in-law after marriage, parents can help to select the right kind of daughter-in-law:
she had better be submissive to family authority, be cooperative in delivering old age support,
and be diligent in doing household chores. Under the assumption that more children imply
more old age support, parents may also use matchmaking to ensure that their son has more
children to provide him old age support in the future. Because urban areas rely less on
children for old age support (and enforce the one-child-policy more vigorously), the demand
for the number of children under parental matchmaking would be lower in urban regions
than in rural regions. Moreover, since urban areas present more market opportunities, urban
parents may emphasize more on sharable monetary income than rural parents.
We take these predictions to a sample of about 3400 rural couples and 3800 urban couples
in 1991 in seven Chinese provinces. Here 48% of rural couples and 14.5% of urban couples
were married by parent-involved matchmaking; the rest by either self search or friend intro-
duction (both of which are referred to as self match). We examine a number of marriage
outcomes, including the degree of domestic harmony to capture the emotional output of
marriage, the joint income of husband and wife to capture the couple's economic well-being,
2See Heckman (2008) for evidence on how parent inﬂuence on children is more prominent when children
are young.
4
and measures of inputs to sharable household goods such as the number of children, the
son's belief in old age support, and the submissiveness of the daughter-in-law.
Comparison across parental and self matching largely supports our theoretical predic-
tions. In both rural and urban areas, parent-involved matches yield a lower marital harmony;
in contrast, parent-matched marriages yield higher couple income in urban areas, but lower
income in rural areas, all after we control for individual-level observable and unobservable at-
tributes that may lead to selection in parental matchmaking. In rural areas, parent-matched
marriages are associated with more children. Moreover, wives in parent-matched marriages
tend to hold more traditional views that emphasize women's secondary status within a fam-
ily. The diﬀerent results in rural and urban areas can be explained by relative abundance
of labor market opportunities and weaker traditional beliefs in urban relative to rural areas.
Our results are consistent with Becker, Murphy and Spenkuch (2015): parents can med-
dle with children's (or children-in-law's) preferences to ensure old age support. We further
provide evidence that parental matchmaking is an important vehicle to achieve this goal.
In addition to oﬀering evidence in support of BMS (2015), this paper contributes to the
marriage literature by highlighting the economic tradeoﬀ in parental matchmaking. Unlike
the classical focus on the eﬀects of sex ratio (Angrist 2002), divorce law (Chiappori 2002),
or educational composition on marriage outcomes, we show that the institutional details
of how the match is accomplished in the ﬁrst place have important implications on mar-
riage outcomes.3 In a related paper, Edlund and Lagerlof (2006) show that the shift from
parental to individual consent in marriage allows the young couple instead of their parents
to receive the bride price and thus facilitates economic growth. We diﬀer in that our focus
is not on who controls resources in a marriage, but on the economic tradeoﬀ of parental
matchmaking for both parents and children. The tradeoﬀ between love and money has been
explored by Fernandez et al. (2005) but from the perspective of marriage sorting on skills
and its relationship with income inequality; they do not discuss matchmaking methods.4 Our
paper is also related to Cheung (1972), who argues that many traditional Chinese family
practices,5 including marriage patterns, are shaped by parental considerations to maximize
family wealth. That paper does not focus on the eﬀect of matchmaking methods; neither
does it oﬀer empirical evidence.
In a short paper, Huang, Jin and Xu (2012) use the same data source to examine the
3Some other papers related to marriage include Zhang and Chan (1999), Foster and Rosenzweig (2000),
Chiappori et al. (2002), Suen, Chan and Zhang (2003), and Huang et al. (2009).
4See also Blood (1967) for descriptive analysis of love and arranged marriages.
5China-speciﬁc papers and books on marriage include Chao (1983), Xu and Whyte (1990), Cohen (1992),
and Zimmer and Kwong (2003), none of which examines how parent matchmaking aﬀects marriage outcomes
and how considerations of old age support aﬀect these eﬀects.
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eﬀect of parental matchmaking on love and couple income in urban China. This paper
diﬀers from Huang, Jin and Xu (2012) in several ways. First, we oﬀer a formal model and
expand the sharable production from joint couple income to many non-marketable household
productions such as the number of children and the submissiveness of the wife. Second, we
examine the issue from the parents' perspective in old age support and explain why parent
matchmaking might aﬀect marriage outcomes diﬀerently in urban and rural areas. When
we presented Huang, Jin and Xu (2012) in a conference at the University of Chicago, Gary
Becker presented what later became BMS (2015) and encouraged us to go beyond what is
in Huang, Jin and Xu (2012) to consider parents' need for old age support.6 This paper
incorporates his suggestions.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature of intergenerational relationship and old
age support. Researchers have explored how intergenerational relationships aﬀect old age
support (see, for instance, Ikkink, Tilburg and Knipscheer, 1999; Hoﬀ, 2007). However, none
has explored the role that matchmaking methods play in facilitating old age support.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical in-
sights, Section 3 summarizes the data, and Section 4 presents the empirical results. A brief
conclusion is oﬀered in Section 5.
2 Theoretical Framework and Empirical Identiﬁcation
In this section, we ﬁrst present an agency model of parent matchmaking and then interpret
it in the context of old age support in rural and urban China. The last subsection discusses
empirical implications and how we plan to test them with data.
2.1 Agency model of parental matching
Consider the marital decision of a young man, who has ﬁnished schooling and started working
to earn a living. The search process for a potential wife can either be conducted directly
by his parents or by himself. The process that yields a higher net expected utility to him
will be implemented. This set up is meant to capture the current practice in China, where
marriage in general cannot be forced upon by parents, and males are usually the one who
6One of us (Xu) presented an earlier version of Huang, Jin and Xu (2012) at the Chicago-Remin conference
on family and labor economics in 2012 at the University of Chicago, right after Gary Becker presenting an
earlier version of Becker, Murphy, Spenkuch (2015). For a new researcher working on marriage topics, having
Becker's comment on an early draft was no doubt the best luck he could encounter. (For this, we thank
Dali Yang for inviting us to the conference.) Indeed, Becker oﬀered so many constructive comments that he
completely changed our perspecitve on the issue. His main suggestions were that we should also consider
parental matchmaking from the parents' point of view, that parents might use this method to ensure old age
support, that preference might be important (which was a key point in his presentation), and that parental
matchmaking may not be ineﬃcient given speciﬁc institutional and social arrangements.
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initiates and proposes marriage.7
2.1.1 Basic Set up
An individual's beneﬁt from marriage can be categorized into two dimensions: one is the
economic gain from joint household production, and the other is emotional support from the
spouse. The total beneﬁt is aﬀected not only by the characteristics of husband and wife, but
also by their matching quality.
Let hm ≥ 0 denote the young man's human capital level, which aﬀects his earning and his
intra-household productivity. The human capital may capture, for example, his character,
innate ability, years of schooling, communication skills, and so on. Similarly, let hf ≥ 0
denote his potential wife's human capital level. Combined, hm and hf determine the total
marriage gains f(hf , hm), which reﬂects both the couple's household production output and
joint income earned from markets. We assume f(0, 0) > 0, fi > 0, fij > 0, and fii ≤ 0 for
i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
Another key element in marriage is match quality, denoted by α which is idiosyncratic
to the couple and not readily observed by others; it can be interpreted as love or attraction
between two persons, which is often unpredictable based on commonly observed characteris-
tics. This implies that α can be treated as uncorrelated with hf . Given our assumption that
marriage is always implemented with mutual consent by the young couple, the emotional
output of marriage can be normalized as positive and α > 0 is assumed.8
For a young man with hm, the overall gain from marrying a wife with hf and α is
(β+α)f(hf , hm), where β > 0. One may think of the parameter β as capturing the husband's
share of material gain from the marriage, while α captures the degree of emotional beneﬁt.
The parents' gain from their son being married to a wife with characteristics (α, hf ) also
contains two parts: one is the public good component f(hf , hm) that generates a utility of
γ · f(hf , hm), and the other is the altruistic component δ(β +α)f(hf , hm) because they care
about the welfare of their son, where γ > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1). Since the love α between the hus-
band and wife is by deﬁnition consumed privately by the couple themselves, it does not aﬀect
the parents' welfare directly. The wife's characteristics that may aﬀect the whole family, such
as pleasant personality and beauty, are already indicated by the wife's human capital hf ,
which as mentioned earlier is broadly deﬁned and not restricted to formal schooling.9
7It is useful to note that a similar model can be used to study the search process of a young woman, and
it can also be readily extended to the case where parents arrange the marriage without consent of children.
8This assumption is for simplicity only, as the same results can be derived for the case with α ≤ 0.
9Parents may have other gains from doing matchmaking than the elements already shown in the model;
as long as these concerns are not identical with those of their children, our main results should hold.
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2.1.2 Searching Costs
Marital search is costly. If searching himself, the son has to bear the search cost, which
is ηmc(α, hf , hm) > 0, where ηm, c1, c2 > 0 and c3, c31, c32 < 0. This means that it is more
costly for a man with a given hm to ﬁnd and persuade a woman with better quality (with
higher α or hf ) to become his wife, and the search cost for a wife of a given quality is lower
if the man's hm is higher. The parameter ηm denotes the eﬀect of some common elements on
the search cost by oneself for all individuals in a marriage market and is thus not dependent
on idiosyncratic conditions of searching.
If the marriage is through parent search, parents will bear the search cost, which presum-
ably depends on how intelligent they are in assessing α and how well they are connected with
relevant social networks that have access to potential candidates. The parents' degree of com-
petence in this matter is denoted by hp ≥ 0. The parental search cost is ηps(α, hf , hp) > 0,
where ηp, s1, s2 > 0 and s3, s31, s32 < 0. Similar to ηm, the parameter ηp denotes some com-
mon factor that aﬀects the cost of searching by all parents. To capture the idea that the
match quality α is couple idiosyncratic, we assume that, in order to achieve the same level
of α, the parents' search cost cannot be too low compared with the direct search by their
son, i.e., ηps1 ≥ δηmc1 for any given hm, hf , and hp.
2.1.3 The Son's Optimal Choice of Search Methods
The son decides whether to search for his marriage partner himself or to delegate the search
to his parents. If he searches himself, his objective function is
U∗ ≡ max
α,hf
(β + α)f(hf , hm)− ηmc(α, hf , hm).
The corresponding optimal choices of his potential wife's characteristics that result from
searching by himself are denoted by α∗ and h∗f , which are characterized by the following ﬁrst
order conditions
f(h∗f , hm)− ηmc1(α∗, h∗f , hm) = 0, (1)
(β + α∗)f1(h∗f , hm)− ηmc2(α∗, h∗f , hm) = 0. (2)
If his parents manage the search, their objective function is
U˜ ≡ max
α,hf
[γ + δ(β + α)]f(hf , hm)− ηps(α, hf , hp),
where the corresponding optimal choices are denoted by α∗∗ and h∗∗f . The necessary condi-
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tions that characterize α∗∗ and h∗∗f are
δf(h∗∗f , hm)− ηps1(α∗∗, h∗∗f , hp) = 0, (3)
[γ + δ(β + α∗∗)]f1(h∗∗f , hm)− ηps2(α∗∗, h∗∗f , hp) = 0. (4)
It is not diﬃcult to see that in general the optimal wives are diﬀerent between these two
search processes.
Then the son's choice problem is
max{U∗ ≡ (β + α∗)f(h∗f , hm)− ηmc(α∗, h∗f , hm);U∗∗ ≡ (β + α∗∗)f(h∗∗f , hm)}, (5)
where the second term is the son's net utility when his parents do the search for him.
Searching by himself will prevail if U∗ ≥ U∗∗, while his parents will be delegated to do the
search if the opposite U∗ < U∗∗ is true.10 The main implications of the optimal solution to
this problem are summarized by the following propositions (see Appendix A for proof):
Proposition1: Eﬀects of Parental Matchmaking: The emotional output and the over-
all marriage gain to the son are lower under parental involvement, i.e., α∗f(h∗f , hm) >
α∗∗f(h∗∗f , hm) and (β + α
∗)f(h∗f , hm) ≥ (β + α∗∗)f(h∗∗f , hm) hold, respectively. But it is
possible that the couple's joint household production is higher, i.e., f(h∗f , hm) ≤ f(h∗∗f , hm)
may be true.
Proposition2: Adverse Selection of the Son: There exists a unique threshold value h#m of
the son's human capital level such that he will choose to search for a marriage partner himself
if hm ≥ h#m or delegate his parents to do the search for him if hm < h#m. The threshold h#m
increases with hp, γ and ηm.
Proposition3 : Positive Selection of Parents: There exists a unique threshold value h#p of
the parents' competence level such that they will be delegated to do the search iﬀ hp > h
#
p ,
where h#p increases with hm but decreases with γ and ηm.
These propositions suggest that the eﬀects of parental involvement in marriage search can
be diﬀerent for the two dimensions of marriage output: it is always negative for the emotional
output, which is driven by the fact that the matching quality  love α  is idiosyncratic to the
couple and thus not easily observed or shared by others; the eﬀect on the economic output,
however, can be either negative or positive. The reason for a positive eﬀect is because
the household output can be shared among family members and thus parents have more
incentives to care about the potential wife's human capital. On the other hand, parental
10If parents can arrange the marriage without consent from the son, as is the case in traditional society, the
parents are the ﬁnal decision maker and their objective function would be max{[γ+δ(β+α∗)]f(h∗f , hm); [γ+
δ(β + α∗∗)]f(h∗∗f , hm)− ηps(α∗∗, h∗∗f , hp)}.
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involvement could have a negative eﬀect on the economic output and is still an optimal
choice from the son's perspective if parental matchmaking leads to substantial savings in
search cost.
Propositions 1-3 also suggest that parental involvement in marital search is endogenous
to individual attributes; it is more likely to happen when the son's human capital level hm is
lower or the searching cost ηm is higher, or when his parents beneﬁt more from the household
public good (when γ is higher) and have lower searching costs (when hp is higher and ηp is
lower). In other words, in a ﬁxed marriage market, there are two sources of self-selection in
the choice of marital search methods: one is from the son and the other is from the parents;
a young man with a lower human capital, or with parents that are more capable or more
motivated is more likely to rely on parental search.
Figure 1 illustrates the positive relationship between h#m and h
#
p and how their combina-
tion aﬀects the endogenous choice of marital searching methods. In the graph, a young man
with human capital h
′
m and parents' eﬀectiveness h
′
p, for example, will optimally choose to
rely on his parents to search for a potential wife because his human capital is lower than
the threshold level h#m corresponding to his parents' eﬀectivenessh
′
p. This choice can also be
understood from the alternative perspective: given his human capital level h
′
m, his parents
are competent enough (since h′p is higher than the corresponding threshold level h
#
p ) to ﬁnd
a good wife for him so that he does not bother to search by himself.
2.2 Parental Perspective in light of Old Age Support
The above agency model is based on the child's perspective, that is, it is his decision to
choose self search or parent search. In this subsection, we interpret the model from the
parent's perspective, especially in light of their need for old age support.
Since old age support entails ﬁnancial support and home services from the married cou-
ple, parents, if ﬁnancially constrained, have extra demand for the daughter-in-law's ability
in producing labor income and/or home services. This implies that the attributes that can
contribute to these production abilities, for example schooling for labor income and submis-
siveness for home services, will be favored under parental matchmaking.
The rural-urban diﬀerences in the provision of old age support have implications on what
types of marriages and wife traits the parents would prefer. In urban areas, parents tend to
have better access to old age support through state-provided pension and health insurance if
they have worked at a government unit, a state-owned enterprise, or a state-funded non-proﬁt
organization. This signiﬁcantly reduces the ﬁnancial risks faced by old people and their
10
adult children. In sharp contrast, until the 2000s almost all rural residents had no access
to state-provided pension or health insurance, unless they held an urban hukou as a teacher
or were government oﬃcials (which were rare). In our model, a greater reliance on adult
children for old age support can be interpreted as rural parents putting more weight on
the couple's sharable production relative to the son's welfare (i.e. higher γ). This implies
greater agency cost under parental matching, as the wife candidates ﬁltered by parents will
demonstrate more attributes preferable by the parents for their old age support (∂h∗∗f /∂γ > 0
mathematically).
Strong implications on what types of wife the son would want are also provided by BMS
(2015), which modiﬁes the implications of our model signiﬁcantly. So far we assume that
the son cares only about his own welfare while parents are altruistic, following the standard
assumption in Becker's Rotten Kids Theorem (Becker 1981). BMS (2015) argue that parents
have incentives to manipulate the son's preference when he was young so that he is more
altruistic towards the parents' old age support when he grows up. This is consistent with the
traditional value of Chinese families, which emphasizes that it is the son's duty to continue
the surname by having children and to take care of parents when they are old. If the son's
altruism is incorporated in our model, the son's preference will be more aligned with the
parent's preference (e.g. allow β to increase with γ). Not only does this reduce the agency
cost of parental matchmaking (thus leading to more parental matchmaking), but it also
encourages the son to choose a wife closer to the parents' preferences even if he decides to
search by himself. BMS (2015) thus reconﬁgure the forces underlying the costs and beneﬁts
of parent matchmaking so that the beneﬁts now loom larger, and parents' demand for certain
traitssay, submissiveness of the daughter-in-lawis more likely to win out in the end. It also
renders the son to be more willing to delegate the search to parents.
Another key diﬀerence between rural and urban residents is that rural couples have more
freedom in choosing how many children to have, and this freedom aﬀects the impact of parent
matchmaking on the number of children for the couple. Though both rural and urban China
adopted one-child policy since early 1980s, enforcement is looser in rural areas. One reason
is that rural labor is an important input for agricultural production, and without access
to pension and health insurance, having a greater number of children is an important way
to ensure old age support. Furthermore, enforcement is more diﬃcult in rural areas: while
urban employers, especially state-owned enterprises and government units, can threaten (and
often do threaten) to demote, ﬁne, or even ﬁre those who attempt to have more than one
child, such threats are not credible in rural areas. Thus, rural residents, if they want, can
have more children than urban couples.
How would parent matchmaking aﬀect the number of children for the rural couple then?
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Due to the lack of old age support, parents would need more children. However, by the time
when the adult son gets married, most parents have already completed their own fertility
decisions and they would not beneﬁt directly from the number of grandchildren that the
couple have. Yet still, parents would demand more children for their son: altruistic parents
anticipate the son's need for old age support and prefer a traditional wife that provides
more children for their son. Thus, parental matchmaking is likely to be associated with a
greater number of children for the couple. In contrast, with less freedom in fertility, urban
parents may resort to other means to ensure old age support from their children, for example,
aiming for higher human capital and higher couple income, even if that means less adherence
to traditional values.11 We thus expect a smaller or no eﬀect of parent matchmaking on the
number of children, but a more pronounced eﬀect on daughter-in-law traits that are more
conducive for labor market income and/or in-home provision of old age support.
2.3 Empirical Issues
To summarize, we argue that some conﬂict of interest may arise between parents and son
because parents rely on their married son for old age support and other sharable production
of the couple, but love is more or less private consumption within the couple.12 This con-
ﬂict of interest, combined with search cost in the marriage market, leads to an interesting
relationship between parental matchmaking, husband's belief about old age support, wife
characteristics, and marriage outcomes such as love and joint couple income. The main in-
sight is that parents involved in matchmaking prefer a wife that can provide more sharable
production, even if such preferences lead to less love within the couple.
However, this prediction is subject to the constraint of the son's endogenous choice of the
matchmaking method. In particular, the choice of search method may not only be aﬀected
by random elements, but also by the son's and his parents' characteristics as reﬂected by the
adverse and positive selection problems in the above propositions.
If we can perfectly control parents' characteristics (hp, γ), then the average marital quality
11There are other factors to consider when discussing the eﬀect of parent matchmaking on the number
of children. Parents may view too many chidlren as competition for the limited resources that the couple
have. In other words, what grandchildren have, the grandparents have not. On the other hand, grandparents
tend to enjoy the companion and even household production from grandchildren (e.g., fetching water where
there is no indoor water), and this would result in a positive relationship between parent matchmaking
and the number of children for the couple. The overall eﬀect of parent matchmaking on the number of
children may therefore be ambiguous. However, children tends to be less costly to raise in rural areas due
to intergenerational cohabitation, the competition eﬀect should be weaker in rural areas, again pushing for
a more positive and pronounced relationship between parent matchmaking and the number of children.
12That love is a private good is nicely illustrated by an episode of Seinfeld. Jerry and Elaine, once lovers
and then friends for a long time, became lovers again. Witnessing Jerry and Elaine's intimate behavior,
Kramer, Jerry's old friend and neighbor, blurted out, I like you two so much more when you were friends!
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of husbands with parental involvement must be lower than others even when their wives are of
exactly the same quality because the husbands in the former group have lower human capital
(hm < h
#
m); this is the adverse selection eﬀect of sons. In contrast, when the husband's
characteristics are fully controlled, those with parental involvement must have had more
competent parents (hp > h
#
p ) with respect to searching, which implies that their wife's
overall quality, especially their human capital level h∗∗f , may be higher than others', and
hence their marital quality may also be higher; this is the positive selection eﬀect of parents.
Thus, without properly accounting for these two sources of the endogeneity problem, the
OLS estimated coeﬃcient of parental matchmaking can be either higher or lower than the
true eﬀect, depending on which selection is dominant.
Our approach to address this challenge is to use an instrumental variable that aﬀects
the choice of search method but not wife characteristics and marital outcomes directly.
Consider two identical marriage markets A and B that are mutually exclusive. Due to some
exogenous shocks, the threshold level of the son's human capital h#m as a function of parents'
characteristics hp shifts down in market A but not in B. This can be achieved in the model,
for example, by a lower ηm, which aﬀects the search costs of all individuals in a marriage
market. As one can see in Figure 1, this downward shift in market A will induce a group
of young men, who are between the new and old threshold curves, to change their search
method from parental involvement to self search. As a result, identical individuals make
diﬀerent choices: those in market B have parental involvement while those in market A
adopt self-search. Comparing their diﬀerence in wife characteristics and marital outcomes
will ﬁlter out the endogeneity in the choice of search method driven by the son or the parents'
individual characteristics.
Empirically, for a husband born in year t, we construct the instrument for his choice of
parental matchmaking as the percent of other husbands of similar ages in the same market
that chose parental matchmaking. Here we deﬁne market by the interaction of province
dummy and rural dummy. Similar age is deﬁned as those who were born in the same year or
one to three year earlier. Admittedly, this market-level instrument may capture local culture
and tradition that aﬀect people's choice of spouse and style of marriage life. Unfortunately,
such culture and tradition evolve slowly, so that the main variations in our instrumental
variable are cross-sectional. This implies that we cannot include provincial ﬁxed eﬀects
without swamping the power of instrument, but we do control for average income and average
schooling at the district level in urban areas and the township level in rural areas.13 In this
sense, our instrument is good at ﬁltering out individual-level selections as articulated in the
13The district level in urban areas is one level below the (county-level) city in China's administrative
ladder.
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above propositions but may pick up unobserved local culture and tradition independent of
average income or schooling in local city/township.
In particular, we estimate the following speciﬁcation:
Yi = α0 + αrural + β1 · ParentMatchedi + β2 · Zi + β3 · Ztownship + i
where Yi denotes marital outcomes, wife characteristics, and husband i's belief in old age
support; αrural is a dummy for rural areas; Zi denotes husband's observable characteris-
tics such as age, religion, schooling, and party membership (we also include his parents'
schooling); Ztownship denotes average income and schooling at district/township level; and
ParentMatchedi is a dummy indicating whether i's parents were involved in the search for
his wife.
We shall estimate this equation with both OLS and 2SLS. While βols1 suﬀers from
individual-level selection issues, β2sls1 is free of such issues. Because the variation of our
instrument is mostly cross-sectional, we should interpret the 2SLS estimate in the follow-
ing way: if i lived in a diﬀerent marriage market that is more oriented towards parental
matchmaking and this relocation increases his own probability of using parental match-
making by ∆p, then the outcome Yi would change by β
2sls
1 · ∆p. Markets that diﬀer in
parental matchmaking norms are likely to have diﬀerent family value and diﬀerent social
networking patterns along with the matchmaking norm. These diﬀerences, if independent
of township-level average income and average schooling, are embodied in our instrument. In
other words, the 2SLS estimate captures the eﬀect of moving from a market with low parent-
matchmaking norm (and less traditional value) to a market with high parent-matchmaking
norm (and more traditional value). It does not capture the eﬀect of moving from low to high
parent-matchmaking norm, conditional on the same level of (unobserved) traditional value.
In other words, this instrument does not allow us to separate the eﬀect of parent matching
norms and other highly correlated traditional values.
3 Data and Measurements
3.1 Data Source
We use the Study of the Status of Contemporary Chinese Women (SSCCW), a data set
collected jointly by the Population Institute of Chinese Academy of Social Science and the
Population Council of United Nations in 1991 (Institute of Population Studies, 1993). SS-
CCW collects information on personal traits, marriage characteristics, fertility, work, intra-
family arrangements, and gender norms. The survey used stratiﬁed random sampling to
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select households from one municipality (Shanghai) and 6 provinces (Guangdong, Sichuan,
Jilin, Shandong, Shanxi, and Ningxia). They scatter across China in the southeast, south,
southwest, northeast, east, middle and north, respectively. As migration across diﬀerent
provinces was not common in China by 1991, each province can be regarded as a separate
marriage market. Another important dimension that cuts across areas is the urban-rural dis-
tinction. The rigid Hukou system eﬀectively blocked people from migrating between cities
and countryside at the time of the survey. Furthermore, although our data consist of married
couples only, we do not face much selection in divorce. The divorce rate around our sample
period, 1990, was only 0.71 per 1000 couples, far below the corresponding numbers in many
countries in 1995, which are 4.44 in the U.S. and 1.59 in Japan (Zeng and Wu 2000).
SSCCW interviewed husband and wife separately. Here we focus on the male sample
because a Chinese couple tends to live with the husband's parents by tradition (if they live
with any parent at all), and therefore the paternal parents have clearer incentives to value
a marriage candidate's ability in economic and home production. Our sample thus consists
of husbands. Wife characteristics will be examined as dependent variables, as they are the
result of the choice of the husband (and his parents if they were involved in the search
process).
3.2 Old Age Support From Adult Children
A key assumption in our theoretical framework section is that children, especially those in
rural areas, are key providers of old age support, and parents may prefer certain types of
daughter-in-laws to deliver them old age support. We now provide some suggestive evidence
from SSCCW to validate our assumption.
Based on a few questions on old age support, a signiﬁcant share of residents, especially
the rural ones, rely more on their children for old age support. On the question of what
you expect to get from your son when you grow old, 4.6% of urban husbands answered
ﬁnancial support, 43.5% answered home services, 38.2% answered emotional support, and
13.2% answered nothing. In comparison, rural husbands expected more old age support
from their sons: 19.8% of them expected ﬁnancial support, 67% expected home services,
9.1% expected emotional support, and only 3.8% expected nothing. Similar patterns occur
on a parallel question of what you expect to get from your daughter when you are old,
but both urban and rural husbands expected more emotional support from their daughters
(41.5% in urban and 29.8% in rural), and less ﬁnancial support (2.4% urban, 11.5% rural)
than from sons. On home services, urban husbands expected about same home services from
daughters (44%) as from sons (43.5%), while rural husbands expected less home services
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from daughters (51.4%) than from sons (67%).
Wives are likely to contribute more to old age support than husbands inside the house-
hold. The SSCCW survey asked urban husband and wife separately on who is the main
provider of certain types of house work, including home service to the elderly. Conditional
on existing need of home service to the elderly, 40% of husbands and 57% of wives said they
were the main service provider in the house. Husbands seem to have a bias in exaggerating
their role as the main contributor: while only 39% of husbands admitted that their wives
being the main provider of old age support, 57% of wives claiming themselves being the main
provider. Similarly, 23% of wives credited their husbands as the main contributor of old age
support in the house, while 40% of husbands credited as such themselves. Unfortunately,
this question was not asked in the rural sample, but rural couples were more likely to live
with the husband's parents at the time of marriage (59% rural, 31% urban, according to
husband's answer), and it is quite rare to live with the wife's parents in both rural and ur-
ban areas (5% rural, 6% urban, according to husband's answer). At the time of the survey,
fewer rural couples were still living with the husband's parents (29% rural and 39.9% urban),
but this is partly because more rural parents have passed away, and rural parents have more
children to live with so that the probability of living with a particular child would be lower.
To recap, the survey data conﬁrm that rural parents rely more on their children for old
age support, and old age support is typically provided by son and daughter-in-law. Between
the couple, the wife is more likely to provide home services to the elderly if such need
arises. All these suggest that parents have strong incentives to participate in the choice of
daughter-in-law, especially in the rural areas.
3.3 Key Variables
The question on matchmaking methods asked how an individual met his or her spouse
initially. There are four original categories in the data: introduced by parents or relatives,
by friends, by themselves, and by other means. We deﬁne a dummy of ParentMatch equal
to one if the husband has been matched by the introduction of parents or relatives and 0 if
otherwise. We cannot distinguish parents from relatives partly because the distinction is not
available in the data, partly because relatives are an integrated part of the parents' social
networks to facilitate the search process. A perhaps more debatable decision is that we do not
diﬀerentiate couples initially introduced by friends from those who met by themselves. The
reason is that these two groups are similar: in both cases, it is the young people themselves,
not their parents, that conducted the search process and bore the search cost. And indeed,
empirically these two groups are very similar.
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The survey also asked whether the marriage decision was made by self or parents. Sub-
jects were asked to choose from self decision, parental consent, self decision, parental
disapproval, self decision, parental consent on both sides, self decision, parental disap-
proval on both sides, parental decision, self indiﬀerent, parental decision, self consent
and parental decision, self consent by force. Answer to this question diﬀers greatly by
whether ParentMatch is equal to one. For the sample of husbands, 33.8% of them had
parental matchmaking. Among those parent matched marriages, 26.6% were parental de-
cision rather than self decision. In comparison, only 6.9% of self matched marriages were
parental decision.
Rural parents seem to play a more important role in their children's marriage life than
urban parents. This is well reﬂected in our data: 48% of our rural couples were married
via parental matchmaking, while this percentage is only 14.5% for urban couples. Moreover,
30.5% of parent-matched husbands had his marriage decided by his parents in rural areas,
as compared to 13.8% in urban areas.
From a husband's perspective, marriage outcomes are represented by love, joint income,
non-marketable household production, and wife traits. Given the diﬃculty to quantify love,
we follow Huang, Jin and Xu (2012) to proxy the emotional dimension of marriage by an
indicator of harmony within a couple. The survey question most closely related to the emo-
tional aspect of marriage asked: "How do you usually reconcile with your spouse when you
have conﬂicts?" We deﬁne a harmony index as follows: it is equal to 2 if the couple reported
no conﬂicts, 1 if conﬂicts are usually solved by mutual compromise, and 0 if conﬂicts are
solved by either unilateral compromise or third-party mediation by family members, relatives
or friends. Third-party involvement in conﬂict solution is a rare event in the data (only 3%
reported so) so we do not distinguish it from unilateral compromise. The implication is that
"no conﬂicts" is the best outcome, while "mutual compromise" comes next in the ranking,
which is arguably less costly or more eﬀective than unilateral compromise and third-party
mediation. Mutual compromise is better than unilateral compromise also because constant
reliance on unilateral compromise eventually leads to resentment and the loss of love. In
our view, this harmony index captures the essential meaning of a couple's matching quality:
couples with better matching quality are less likely to have conﬂicts and more capable of
solving conﬂicts in an eﬀective way. Though imperfect, the above-mentioned harmony index
is a more appropriate measure of the emotional output of marriage in our context than others
used in the literature. In modern western societies, for example, whether a marriage ends up
in divorce is a natural measure of marital quality. The extremely low divorce rate in China
by 1991, however, renders this measure less useful.
Joint couple income is measured by the summation of the annual incomes of the husband
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and of the wife. This is a key measure for the market component of marriage gains. It is
perhaps useful to keep in mind that maximized couple income could be achieved either by
both work for market incomes or by specialization, that is, one works for the market while
the other specializes in household production.
We also measure wife traits to study whether parent matchmakers systematically prefer
wives of certain traits. As we have emphasized so far, parents have strong incentives to obtain
old age support from children, and daughter-in-laws are especially instrumental in delivering
home services for old age support. Indeed, old age support can be obtained in two ways:
money transfer from children, or direct provision of home services to the elderly.14 Because
old age support in the household is usually provided by the wife, its eﬀective delivery requires
values and beliefs conformative to a traditional society. Indeed, for thousands of years in
Chinese history, a top value for children is ﬁlial piety (Cheung, 1972), which emphasizes
being obedient and submissive to parents. Indeed, the second Chinese character for ﬁlial
piety, xiao shun, means literally being submissive and following orders of parents. This is
especially important for picking a wife for the son: the son was already trained to be obedient
to parents within the household for all the years, but the wife will join the family as an adult
and it is almost impossible to train her to be submissive after marriage. Thus, matchmaking
parents would prefer to pick a young woman that have already submitted to those submissive
values (Cheung, 1972). Such values would be conducive to the happiness of the parents and
to the provision of old age support.
To measure the submissiveness of the wife, we rely on three speciﬁc measures and one
aggregate measure. First, Wife Career Unimportant is a dummy variable indicating an
answer in agreement to the following statement: a wife's career achievement should not
exceed that of her husband. This indicates conformity to the traditional value of superiority
of man over woman, and makes husbands' wishes easier to carry through in the family.
Second, No Good Male Friend is a dummy variable indicating the belief that a married
woman should not have a good male friend. Again, this is a preventive belief that helps
to maintain the value of parental investment in picking a submissive and cooperative wife
for their son. With such a belief, there is a much lower chance of marriage disruption, and
parent investment in picking the right wife would have a longer horizon to bear fruit. This
is very similar to what Cheung interpreted about the Chinese marriage practice of blind
marriage (i.e., groom and bride were supposed to meet each other for the ﬁrst time upon
the completion of the procedure on the wedding day): it disallows a young man's love for
14Old age support through household production does not necessarily entails cohabitation. As long as
parents and their adult children live suﬃciently close, direct household production of old age support is
feasible.
18
beauty to stand in the way of maximizing family wealth via arranged marriages. Third,
Cannot Reject Sex is a dummy variable that is based on the following question: do you
think a wife can reject her husband's request for sex? 1. yes, 2. no, 3. yes but hard to get
it accomplished. The answers of 2 and 3 imply Cannot Reject Sex to be one. Finally, the
three measures are summed into an aggregate index, Wife Submissiveness. Clearly, a higher
value of Wife Submissiveness implies a wife that is more submissive, easier to manipulate,
and more conducive to parents' old age support.
Finally, we also measure whether the husband has belief in providing old age support.
Having such a belief is a key part of Becker, Murphy and Stenkuch (2015): to ensure old
age support, parents invest resources in manipulating children's preferences so that they are
more altruistic toward the parents. Because we argue that parental matchmaking leads to
a better fulﬁllment of parents' agenda which includes old age support, we follow Becker,
Murphy and Spenkuch (2015) to examine whether parental matchmaking is systematically
associated with the son having stronger preferences for providing old age support. In the
survey, one question asked: in your view, what is the best way to allocate household assets?
1. to distribute evenly among sons and daughters, 2. mainly to sons, 3. mainly to daughters,
4. to the sons or daughters that provide old age support. When the answer is 4, the newly
created dummy variable, Reward for Providing Old Age Support, is set equal to 1.
One may argue that Reward for Providing Old Age Support can be interpreted as a
measure of incentives rather than preferences for providing old age support. We however
interpret it mainly as a belief: the wording is not about whether the husband in our survey
had received an ex-ante oﬀer of inheritance conditional on providing old age support. Such
contracts are uncommon and non-enforcible in China. Rather, the question is among a long
list of belief questions, and it is worded as whether the surveyed husband would reward the
care-giving children more household assets for providing old age support when they are old.
When the husband believes that providers of old age support deserve more household assets,
two scenarios are likely: either the responding husband inherently believes in the moral value
of adult children providing old age support, or his parents (or the local community) have
instilled this value in him. Either way, those believing in Reward for Providing Old Age
Support tend to have a stronger belief in the duty of adult children in providing old age
support to their parents.
3.4 Sample and Summary Statistics
As detailed in Section 2, parental matchmaking is subject to individual-level selection,
and we will use local norm of parental matchmaking as an instrument for individual-level
choice of matchmaking means. As a result, we need a big enough sample to compute the
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norm in every province-urban-age cell where age refers to the same age as or up to three
years older than the survey respondent. We thus delete any province-urban-age cells that
contain fewer than 35 observations. The number of 35 is somewhat arbitrary, but it ensures
a reasonable number of observations to compute the mean (excluding oneself), while at the
same time not losing too many observations of the sample. This restriction leads to a sample
with males no older than early 50s at the time of survey (1990). Dropping old males has
an added beneﬁt: the individuals that remain in our sample do need to consider old age
support for their parents, which suits the purpose of this paper well. In total, we have 6,334
husbands in the analysis sample, 57.6% of which lived in rural areas at the time of survey.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the pooled sample ﬁrst and then urban and
rural separately. Overall, 33.8% of couples were formed via parental matchmaking, but
rural couples went through that route much more frequently (48% vs. 14.5%). Relative to
rural couples, urban couples tend to view their marriages slightly more harmonious, and
earn higher income. Urban husbands have 3.4 more years of schooling than their rural
counterparts, partly because their parents were more educated and partly because the returns
to skills are higher at urban areas. Urban husbands are also more likely to be a Communist
Party member (34.4% versus 10.2%). Rural wives tend to be much less educated (e.g.,
by almost 5 years), and earn less annual income than urban wives. Consistent with our
earlier discussion, rural wives tend to be more submissive or traditional: their score on Wife
Submissiveness is 0.6 standard deviation higher than urban wives, as they are more likely
to consent to Wife Career Unimportant (25% vs 9%), No Good Male Friend (49% vs. 25%),
and Cannot Reject Sex (53% vs. 38%).
Parent-matched couples are diﬀerent from self-matched couples as well. Table 2 shows
that, relative to self-matched couples, parent-matched ones are less harmonious, more likely
to have conﬂicts, and have lower combined income (by 80 log points). Husbands in parent-
matched marriages have signiﬁcantly lower schooling (by 1.6 years), signiﬁcantly less edu-
cated parents (by 1-2 years), and are slightly less likely to be a Communist Party member,
which is associated with higher earning power (Li et al. 2007). They also tend to have
on average 0.4 more children. Wives in parent-matched marriages have 2.4 fewer years of
education, and 43 log points less annual income. Parent-matched wives are more likely to be
submissive than self-matched wives by 1/3 standard deviation. These signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between self- and parent-matched couples suggest serious selection of parental matchmaking
by individual characteristics. That being said, parental matchmaking is associated with a
few market- or township-level variables as well. Parent-matched marriages are more likely
to appear in places where the norm of parental matchmaking is higher, the average income
is lower, and the average schooling is lower. Given the rigid hukou system in China and
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lack of migration in 1990, these geographic diﬀerences are likely beyond the control of any
individual in our sample.
Using the husband sample, Table 3 shows a linear-probability estimation on the determi-
nants of parental matchmaking.15 In column (1) we do not, and in column (2), we do, control
for religion and ethnicity dummies. Rural male was much more likely to be parent-matched
(by 15 to 18 percentage points). The older the husband was at the time of the survey, the
more likely that his marriage was via parental matchmaking. This suggests that parental
matchmaking was strongly related to the era that he lives. Interestingly, relative to atheists,
Muslin male and Buddhist male tend to rely more on parental matchmaking. Some ethnic
groups such as Koreans and Manchurians tend to use parental matchmaking to a greater
extent. Consistent with our summary statistics, the reliance on parental matchmaking is
signiﬁcantly lower when the district or township that he lives in is richer, and when the local
average schooling is higher.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Eﬀect on Love and Joint Income
We ﬁrst examine how parental matchmaking relates to marital harmony and joint couple
income. To isolate the eﬀects of parental matchmaking, we include a long list of control
variables: (1) the husband's own age (in log) and schooling;16 (2) the schooling levels for his
father and his mother; (3) his political aﬃliation with the communist party; (4) his religion
dummies (Muslin, Christian, Buddhist) and ethnicity dummies (Hui, Korean, Manchu, or
other minorities); (5) local development as measured by the average income level and the
average schooling level in the district or township that the couple lives in.17 Since rural
and urban regions diﬀer greatly in marriage markets  historically and culturally rural and
urban residents rarely mixed up in marriage  and their residents also diﬀer greatly in social
security, in all regressions we allow parental matchmaking to have distinct eﬀects in rural
areas. A rural dummy is also included as a control variable.
Our key right hand side variable is parental matchmaking. As detailed in Section 2, a
more competent son will conduct the mate search himself, and conditional on child attributes,
more competent parents are more likely to search for their sons. This is why we control for
15Similar results are found when relying on probit.
16We got very similar results when including age and age squared instead.
17The average income and schooling are computed based on sample information. We exclude the self in
computing the local average to avoid artiﬁcial correlation of these variables and the outcomes of an individual.
We have also tried including other variables such as the ownership dummies of the husband's ﬁrst job.
Their inclusion did not aﬀect any of our key results.
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both child and parent characteristics in the regression. Nevertheless, selection based on
unobservable individual characertisitcs is still likely.
To deal with such individual-level selections, we use local norm of parental matchmaking
as the instrumental variable for one's own matchmaking choice. The social norm of parental
matchmaking is constructed as the share of males getting married via parental matchmaking
in the same province-urban cell with the same age or being older by up to three years.18 We
have tried alternative measures of social norms such as relying on the sample of the same
age only, or the sample of respondents that of the same age or older no more than one (two)
year and so on. The results are qualitatively similar. If a region has a stronger norm of
parental involvement in their children's spousal selection, parents have a larger network of
potential marriage partners for their sons. This would alter their search beneﬁts and costs,
thus directly aﬀecting individual-level reliance on parental matchmaking. On the other hand,
after controlling for the son's characteristics and family background, it is unlikely that the
local social norm would directly aﬀect marriage outcomes. To the extent that matchmaking
norm is correlated with unobserved local culture and tradition that cannot be explained by
average income or schooling diﬀerences across townships, such variations in local culture and
tradition are absorbed in matchmaking norm, and the eﬀect of parent matchmaking should
be viewed as those induced by local parent matchmaking norms and related culture and
tradition. Given the likely prevalence of individual-level selection in parental matchmaking,
we shall mainly rely on the instrumental variable regression results below.
Our baseline results are contained in Table 4. In the ﬁrst 3 columns, we report the results
for Harmony. Column (1) reports the OLS result with a base set of controls; column (2)
adds religion and ethnic dummies; column (3) is the 2SLS result corresponding to column
(2). The next three columns repeat the same structure with the dependent variable being
the logarithm of joint couple income. All standard errors are White-corrected and clustered
at the district / township level since we have local income and schooling controls at this level.
First-stage Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics and Kleibergen-Paap Walk Rank F statistics are
reported at the bottom of Columns (3) and (6). The complete ﬁrst-stage regressions are
reported in Appendix B.
Parental matchmaking is robustly correlated with lower marital harmony. The coeﬃcient
of Parent Matched is consistently negative and signiﬁcant from the two OLS regressions, with
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between urban and rural areas. The instrumental variable estimate
is again negative, more pronounced in magnitude, and statistically signiﬁcant. According to
the 2SLS estimate, increasing Parent Matched by one standard deviation (0.47) would lead
18In computing the average, we exclude the self to avoid artiﬁcial correlation between the instrument and
the endogenous variable.
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to a drop in Harmony by 1.12 standard deviation. The results are consistent with the agency
model where parents' emphasis on sharable marriage production tend to lead to a sacriﬁce
in non-sharable outcomes such as marital harmony.
On joint couple income, the 2SLS results suggest that parental matchmaking has a posi-
tive eﬀect in urban areas but a negative eﬀect in rural areas. In the two OLS speciﬁcations,
Parent Matched is not signiﬁcantly correlated with couple income, probably because the
adverse selection of sons and the positive selection of parents go against each other on fac-
tors that may aﬀect joint couple income. Indeed, once instrumented, the eﬀect of Parent
Matched becomes signiﬁcant in both rural and urban areas. For urban areas, an increase in
Parent Matched by one standard deviation would lead to an increase in couple income by
0.2 standard deviations. For rural areas, the corresponding eﬀect is a drop in couple income
by 0.3 standard deviations.
The contrasting eﬀects on joint income in urban and rural areas likely reﬂect diﬀerent
patterns of old age support and diﬀerent institutional constraints. First, in urban areas,
market opportunities are more abundant (both for labor and for services such as meals,
laundry and care-giving), yet the enforcement of the one-child policy is more stringent,
both factors contributing to urban couples relying more on monetary income (relative to
household production) to deliver old age support. As a consequence, parents in their self
interest to ensure old age support also have strong interest to ensure that the family structure
would yield relatively high income. Thus, the eﬀect of parental matchmaking on joint couple
income tend to be positive in urban areas. In contrast, in rural areas, there are much fewer
opportunities to make money and buy services; but there are more opportunities to evade
the one-child policy. Thus parents have to rely more on household production to ensure
the delivery of old age support. We thus witness a substitution of market production by
household production in rural areas, which explains why the eﬀect of parental matchmaking
on (market) couple income is negative in rural areas. These conjectures also imply that
urban and rural parents might pick wives of diﬀerent skills and traits.
4.2 Eﬀects on Wife's Schooling, Income and Submissiveness
As rural couples rely more on household production for the delivery of old age support than
urban couples, and wives tend to play the role of caregivers in traditional Chinese families, we
expect that rural parents, upon the opportunity to act as matchmaker for their sons, would
have strong incentives to pick potential wives who would specialize in household production.
For smooth delivery of household production, the rural parents would pick daughter-in-laws
that are submissive. While rural parents likely would prefer daughter-in-laws that are both
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submissive and well-educated, such a combination is rare or infeasible. Rural parents there-
fore have to settle for submissiveness at the expense of lower education. We thus expect
matchmaking rural parents end up picking daughter-in-laws with lower educational levels
but higher submissiveness. In contrast, urban reliance on market income (along with some
household care) and the ample payoﬀ for skills in urban areas (including in household pro-
ductions) imply that urban matchmaking parents are less willing to get more submissiveness
at the expense of education. These parents therefore do not necessarily pick higher or lower
levels of schooling of the wife for the son than the son would have picked by himself.
This conjecture is conﬁrmed by the left panel of Table 5. According to the 2SLS estimate,
the eﬀect of Parent Matched is insigniﬁcant in urban areas, but negative and signiﬁcant for
rural areas. The rural eﬀect is quite large: relative to self-matched marriages, one standard
deviation increase in parental matchmaking in rural areas feature wives with 1.04 standard
deviation less schooling.
Note that higher wife schooling does not necessarily translate into higher earnings from
the wife. In fact, as shown in the right panel of Table 5, parent-matched marriages are
associated with signiﬁcantly lower wife earnings in both urban and rural areas, before and
after we control for unobserved individual-level selection by instrumental variable. One
explanation is that wives in parents-matched marriages tend to specialize more in household
production. This is consistent with parents' interest in obtaining more household care.
To check whether parental matchmaking favors a submissive wife, which we presume to
be a key condition for delivering old age support in traditional societies, Table 6 reports re-
gression results ﬁrst on the aggregate measure ofWife Submissiveness, and then on the three
speciﬁc measures separately. The correlation of Parent Matched with Wife Submissiveness is
robustly positive, and the correlation is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between rural and urban
areas. After instrumenting Parent Matched, the eﬀect becomes statistically signiﬁcant and
larger in magnitude.
The rest of Table 8 further relates Parent Matched to Woman Career Not Important, No
Good Male Friend, and Cannot Reject Sex. While urban wives in parent-matched marriages
do not diﬀer from other marriages in terms of downgrading the importance of women's
careers, parent-matched rural wives tend to emphasize signiﬁcantly less on women's careers.
Again, this is consistent with endogenous preference (Becker, 1996): in urban areas where
market opportunities are greater for women, less career discouragement is imposed on women;
in rural areas where market opportunities are less for women but old age support is primarily
dependent on within-household services, parents discourage women's market value more.
Turning to No Good Male Friend, both rural and urban wives under parent-matched
marriages believe more than self-matched wives in that a married woman should not have
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good male friends, as compared to the self-matched wives. This attitude/preference is con-
sistent with more marriage stability and more attention to household production. After all,
outside friendship with the opposite sex could lead to more time spent outside the house-
hold or emotional distraction, both of which may destabilize marriage and invalidate the
investments that parents have already made in ﬁnding the suitable mates for their sons.
Finally, the last panel of Table 6 shows that wives under parent-matched marriages
tend to believe that wives should not reject sex requests by their husbands. Again, this
is consistent with the notion that parents-matched wives are more submissive and respect
more the traditional patriarchal value. Overall, Table 6 renders a strong support to the
argument that relative to wives under self-matched marriages, those under parent-matched
marriages tend to be more submissive and more suitable in providing old age support within
the household.
4.3 Husband's Belief in Old Age Support and the Number of Children
Becker, Murphy and Spenkuch (2015) suggest that parents in need of old age support have
incentives to induce more altruistic preference from their sons, in order to ensure smooth and
committed delivery of old age support. To check this argument, we examine how husband
belief in old age support diﬀers under parent- and self-matched marriages.
In the OLS results of Table 7, Parent Matched is positively correlated with Reward for
Providing Old Age Support (i.e., a belief that old age support should be rewarded), but not
statistically signiﬁcant. When we use the instrument, the coeﬃcient becomes statistically
signiﬁcant and of similar magnitude in urban and rural areas. According to the 2SLS re-
sults, a one-standard-deviation increase in Parent Matched (0.47) is associated with a higher
probability of parent-matched husbands to agree to Reward for Providing Old Age Support
by 0.8 standard deviation. This piece of evidence is consistent with Becker, Murphy and
Spenkuch (2015).
Table 8 associates parental matchmaking with the number of children that the surveyed
couple has. From old age support point of view, parents do not beneﬁt directly from a
greater number of grandchildren. However, altruistic parents may view more grandchildren
as a warranty for their son's old age support and prefer the couple to have more children.
Table 8 reports two panels of results, one on the number of children, and the other on whether
the couple has three or more children. Given the imperfect enforcement of one-child policy
in rural areas, it is common to have two children so the margin for parents to push is on
the third child. In comparison, three or more children is much less likely in urban (6.3%)
than in rural areas (23.5%). This diﬀerence is reﬂected in both OLS and 2SLS results. After
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controlling for individual-level selection by instrumental variable, urban couples are even less
likely to have three or more children if they were parent-matched (marginally signiﬁcant at
10%), but rural couples are much more likely to have three or more children under parental
matchmaking (signiﬁcant at 1%). This is consistent with the argument that since rural
households have little access to state-provided pension and health insurance, they have to
rely heavily on children for old age support.
5 Conclusion
While many economic studies have examined various aspects of marriages, little attention
has been paid to the role that parents play in their children's marriage formation, to how
various matchmaking means aﬀect the selection of spouse and marriage outcomes, and to
how institutional diﬀerences such as the provision of old age support aﬀect the eﬀect of
matchmaking means. In this paper, we use unique data on Chinese households to examine
what types of people use parental matchmaking (versus relying on self matches), and how
parental matchmaking aﬀects marriage harmony, joint income, and husband and wife traits
that are conducive to the delivery of old age support.
In a simple theoretical framework, we show that parental matchmaking may distort
the son's optimal spouse selection because parents tend to emphasize a potential wife's
ability and temperament for providing sharable household goods, and downplay the love or
emotional chemistry within the couple. Put diﬀerently, relative to the son, parents are more
willing to substitute love between the couple for sharable household production. We further
interpret this model in light of parental need for old age support, following BMS (2015).
We ﬁnd supporting evidence for the model: parental involvement is negatively associated
with marital harmony; in comparison, it is associated with more submissive wives, who play
a key role in delivering home services for elderly parents. We also ﬁnd suggestive evidence
that urban and rural areas use diﬀerent supporting mechanisms for old age support. In urban
areas, with more labor market opportunities and more stringent enforcement of the one-child
policy, parents rely more on the monetary income channel for ensuring old age support, and
as a result, parental matchmaking is associated with higher joint couple income. In contrast,
in rural areas, labor market opportunities are fewer and it is easier to evade the one-child
policies. As a result, parents rely more on household production for ensuring old age support,
and rural wives are found to have lower schooling but be more submissive under parental
matchmaking than under self match. Joint income is also lower for parent matched couples
than for self-matched couples in rural areas. These rural-urban contrasts in behavior, along
with the ﬁnding that sons and daughters-in-law tend to have traits and beliefs that are
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conducive for the delivery of old age support, render support to BMS (2015), who argue that
parents systematically manipulate preferences for ensuring old age support. The result is
also consistent with an insight from Cheung (1972): institutions are often evolved to serve
the prevalent needs of economic players. Here, parental matchmaking is conducive to the
delivery of old age support: when capital market is ineﬃcient and old age support is privately
provided, parental matchmaking is employed to ensure that parents can commit their adult
son and daughter-in-law to oﬀer old age support.
Overall, parental matchmaking introduces an interesting tradeoﬀ. On the one hand, it
entails agency costs in terms of less love within the couple. On the other hand, it helps to
ensure old age support for the matchmaking parents, and a more harmonious intergenera-
tional relationship. After our sample period, China has evolved towards more state-provided
pension and health insurance for rural households and the urban poor. As more and more old
age support is provided outside household, traditional values such as ﬁlial piety and submis-
siveness of children may become less important for parents and increasingly unproductive for
the society as a whole (e.g, it may discourage risk-taking, proactive and innovative behaviors
among the young). If our theory is right, we expect parental matchmaking to play diﬀerent
roles in this transition. After all, with more old age support from the society, parents have
less need to manipulate children's preferences or select submissive but less capable (in market
production) daughters-in-law. This topic warrants future research.
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Appendix A: Proof of Propositions
The optimal values of α∗ and h∗f are jointly determined by (1) and (2). Note that α
∗ can be
solved from condition (1) as a function of h∗f , which can then be plugged in (2) to solve h
∗
f .
The optimal values of α∗∗ and h∗∗f are jointly determined by (3) and (4), based on which we
get ∂α∗∗/∂hp > 0 and ∂h∗∗f /∂hp > 0 by Cramer's rule:
∂α∗∗
∂hp
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(−)
ηps13
(+)
δf1 − ηps12
ηps23
(−)
[γ + δ(β + α∗∗)]f11 − ηps22
(−)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ /|H| > 0,
∂h∗∗f
∂hp
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(−)−ηps11 (−)ηps13
δf1 − ηps12
(+)
ηps23
(−)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ /|H| > 0,
where |H| is the determinant of Hessian matrix
|H| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(−)−ηps11
(+)
δf1 − ηps12
δf1 − ηps12
(+)
[γ + δ(β + α∗∗)]f11 − ηps22
(−)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
and |H| > 0 is assumed for the existence of optimal solutions. We can also get ∂α∗∗/∂γ > 0
and ∂h∗∗f /∂γ in a similar way. We assume δf1 − ηps12 ≥ 0, which essentially means that
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∂2U˜/∂α∂hf ≥ 0; and then based on (3) we have
∂α∗∗
∂hf
=
δf1(h
∗
f , hm)− ηps12(α∗, h∗f , hm)
s11
> 0.
Comparing conditions (1) and (3), we can see that α∗(hf ) > α∗∗(hf ) must hold, con-
ditional on the same level of hf ; the reason is that the ﬁrst terms in both conditions are
independent of α while the second terms are strictly increasing in it, which combined with
the assumption ηps1 ≥ δηmc1 will lead to α∗(hf ) > α∗∗(hf ). Given the same α, we may have
h∗f > h
∗∗
f if γ < (1− δ)(β + α) and/or ηmc2 ≤ ηps2, in other words, if parents do not beneﬁt
too much from the daughter-in-law's human capital hf or if their marginal searching cost
with respect to hf is not lower than the son's. The opposite result h
∗
f ≤ h∗∗f is otherwise
possible.
Since the searching cost is always positive,
(β + α∗)f(h∗f , hm) > (β + α
∗∗)f(h∗∗f , hm) (6)
must hold, which then implies α∗ > α∗∗ and α∗f(h∗f , hm) > α
∗∗f(h∗∗f , hm); the reason is as
follows. (i) If h∗f > h
∗∗
f , then α
∗(h∗f ) > α
∗∗(h∗f ) > α
∗∗(h∗∗f ) holds, and it implies α
∗ > α∗∗,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows α∗(hf ) > α∗∗(hf ) and the second follows ∂α∗∗(hf )/∂hf > 0.
And α∗f(h∗f , hm) > α
∗∗f(h∗∗f , hm) follows directly from h
∗
f > h
∗∗
f and α
∗ > α∗∗. (ii) If
h∗f ≤ h∗∗f , then we have
(β + α∗)f(h∗∗f , hm) ≥ (β + α∗)f(h∗f , hm) > (β + α∗∗)f(h∗∗f , hm),
where the ﬁrst and third terms imply α∗ > α∗∗ ; the ﬁrst inequality holds because h∗f ≤ h∗∗f ,
while the second inequality is based on (6). And following similar arguments we can derive
α∗f(h∗f , hm) > α
∗∗f(h∗∗f , hm) by comparing the ﬁrst and third terms in
βf(h∗∗f , hm) + α
∗f(h∗f , hm) ≥ (β + α∗)f(h∗f , hm) > (β + α∗∗)f(h∗∗f , hm).
Based on (5), the utility diﬀerence between self and parents' searching is
pi ≡ U∗ − U∗∗ = (β + α∗)f(h∗f , hm)− ηmc(α∗, h∗f , hm)− (β + α∗∗)f(h∗∗f , hm),
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which is strictly decreasing in hp because
∂pi/∂hp = −f(h∗∗f , hm)∂α∗∗/∂hp − (β + α∗∗)f1(h∗∗f , hm)∂h∗∗f /∂hp < 0.
We get ∂pi/∂hm > 0 for the following reason. Note that
∂pi/∂hm =
∂U∗
∂hm
− ∂(β + α∗∗)f(h∗∗f , hm)/∂hm,
where
∂U∗
∂hm
=
∂(β + α∗)f(h∗f , hm)
∂hm
− ∂ηmc(α
∗, h∗f , hm)
∂hm
(7)
= (β + α∗)f2(h∗f , hm)− ηmc3(α∗, h∗f , hm) > 0 (8)
by the Envelop Theorem. Since
∂2U∗
∂hm∂α
= α∗f2(h∗f , hm)− ηmc31(α∗, h∗f , hm) > 0,
we have
∂U∗
∂hm
|(α∗,h∗f ) >
∂U∗
∂hm
|(α∗∗,h∗f ) > ∂(β + α∗∗)f(h∗f , hm)/∂hm, (9)
where the ﬁrst inequality is because α∗ > α∗∗, and the second inequality is because the
second term of ∂U
∗
∂hm
in (8) is positive. (i) If h∗f > h
∗∗
f , then ∂
2(β + α)f(hf , hm)/∂hm∂hf =
f12(hf , hm) > 0 implies
∂(β + α∗∗)f(h∗f , hm)/∂hm > ∂(β + α
∗∗)f(h∗∗f , hm)/∂hm,
which combined with the inequality in (9) implies
∂U∗
∂hm
|(α∗,h∗f ) > ∂(β + α∗∗)f(h∗∗f , hm)/∂hm,
and this leads to
∂pi/∂hm =
∂U∗
∂hm
(ii) When h∗f ≤ h∗∗f is the case, the result can be derived in a similar way due to
∂(β + α∗∗)f(h∗∗f , hm)
∂hm
<
∂(β + α∗)f(h∗∗f , hm)
∂hm
− ∂ηmc(α
∗, h∗f , hm)
∂hm
<
∂U∗
∂hm
|(α∗,h∗f ),
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where the ﬁrst inequality holds because of α∗∗ < α∗ and −∂ηmc(α∗, h∗f , hm)/∂hm > 0, while
the second inequality holds because (α∗, h∗f ) is the optimal choice to maximize U
∗ than
(α∗, h∗∗f ); comparing the ﬁrst and the third terms we get ∂pi/∂hm > 0.
So the threshold h#p is uniquely determined by
pi = (β + α∗)f(h∗f , hm)− ηmc(α∗, h∗f , hm)− (β + α∗∗(h#p ))f(h∗∗f (h#p ), hm) = 0.
Based on this identity, we get
∂h#p
∂hm
= −∂pi/∂hm
∂pi/∂hp
> 0,
∂h#p
∂γ
= − ∂pi/∂γ
∂pi/∂hp
= −f(h
∗∗
f , hm)∂α
∗∗/∂γ + (β + α∗∗)f1(h∗∗f , hm)∂h
∗∗
f /∂γ
−∂pi/∂hp < 0,
∂h#p
∂ηm
= −∂pi/∂ηm
∂pi/∂hp
=
−c(α∗, h∗f , hm)
−∂pi/∂hp < 0,
The comparative statics for the threshold level h#m can be derived in a similar manner.
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Figure 1: Theoretical Predication on the Son’s Optimal Choice of Matchmaking Method 
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    Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 Pooled Urban Rural 
 mean sd mean sd mean sd 
Rural 0.576 0.494 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
Harmony 1.015 0.715 1.033 0.724 1.000 0.708 
No conflicts 0.253 0.435 0.274 0.446 0.237 0.426 
Ln(couple annual income) 8.752 1.195 9.860 0.795 7.937 0.668 
Parent Matched 0.338 0.473 0.145 0.352 0.480 0.500 
Parent Matched norm 0.351 0.188 0.155 0.053 0.495 0.100 
       
Township Characteristicsa       
Ln(avg individual income at township level) 8.151 1.075 9.226 0.720 7.361 0.387 
Average years of schooling at township level 7.812 2.371 10.288 0.941 5.993 1.134 
       
Husband Characteristics       
Age 34.892 6.291 36.539 6.071 33.682 6.174 
Schooling 8.718 3.218 10.657 2.754 7.293 2.757 
Mother schooling 2.196 3.163 3.678 3.714 1.108 2.103 
Father schooling 4.310 3.719 6.184 3.808 2.933 2.977 
Communist Party member 0.204 0.403 0.344 0.475 0.102 0.302 
 
Couple outcomes 
      
Number of children 1.646 1.025 1.275 0.915 1.918 1.016 
Three or more children 0.162 0.369 0.063 0.244 0.235 0.424 
Reward for providing old age support 0.447 0.497 0.506 0.500 0.405 0.491 
 
Wife traits 
      
Schooling 7.350 3.859 10.067 2.540 5.353 3.418 
Ln(wife annual income) 7.223 0.821 7.742 0.418 6.846 0.836 
Wife submissiveness 1.036 0.882 0.721 0.760 1.271 0.893 
Wife career unimportant 0.184 0.387 0.089 0.285 0.253 0.435 
No good male friend 0.386 0.487 0.249 0.432 0.487 0.500 
Cannot reject sex 0.469 0.499 0.382 0.486 0.534 0.499 
a The average here was computed based on sample information but excluding the individual in the computation.   
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Table 2. Comparison of Key Characteristics by Parent Matchmaking or Not 
 
Parent 
Matched 
(1) 
Non-parent  
Matched 
(2) 
Difference 
(3) = (2) – (1) 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. t-stat. 
Harmony 0.968 0.707 1.038 0.718 0.070 0.019 3.600 
No conflicts 0.224 0.417 0.268 0.443 0.044 0.012 3.843 
ln(couple income) 8.226 1.031 9.020 1.183 0.795 0.030 26.379 
Parent match norm 0.450 0.163 0.300 0.179 -0.149 0.005 32.366 
husband's schooling 7.677 3.153 9.249 3.120 1.572 0.083 18.903 
schooling of the mother of the husband 1.445 2.559 2.580 3.367 1.134 0.083 13.701 
schooling of the father of the husband 3.322 3.330 4.815 3.806 1.493 0.097 15.395 
husband being a Communist Party member 0.140 0.347 0.237 0.425 0.098 0.011 9.177 
number of children 1.895 1.075 1.518 0.974 -0.376 0.027 14.039 
having 3 or more children 0.241 0.428 0.122 0.327 -0.118 0.010 12.237 
wife's schooling 5.736 3.809 8.174 3.618 2.438 0.098 24.919 
ln(wife income) 6.935 0.852 7.369 0.765 0.433 0.021 20.208 
Reward providing old age support 0.446 0.497 0.448 0.497 0.003 0.013 0.195 
Wife submissiveness 1.232 0.901 0.937 0.855 -0.295 0.023 12.651 
Wife career unimportant 0.232 0.422 0.159 0.366 -0.073 0.010 7.103 
No good male friend 0.484 0.500 0.336 0.472 -0.148 0.013 11.525 
Cannot reject sex 0.517 0.500 0.445 0.497 -0.072 0.013 5.430 
ln(avg township income) 7.661 0.860 8.401 1.087 0.740 0.027 27.407 
avg township schooling 6.682 2.018 8.389 2.330 1.707 0.059 28.837 
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Table 3. Determinants of Parent Matchmaking 
 Parent Matchmaking Parent Matchmaking 
Rural 0.147** 0.180*** 
 (0.072) (0.065) 
Husband characteristics   
Ln(age) 0.102*** 0.129*** 
 (0.037) (0.040) 
Schooling -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Mother schooling 0.000 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Father Schooling -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
A Communist Party Member -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.016) (0.015) 
Being a muslin  0.059 
  (0.045) 
Being a chirstian  0.022 
  (0.086) 
Being a buddist  0.169*** 
  (0.063) 
Hui ethnicity  0.069 
  (0.047) 
Korean ethnicity  0.228** 
  (0.089) 
Manchurian ethnicity  0.119* 
  (0.066) 
Other minority ethnicity  0.123 
  (0.110) 
Township characteristics    
Ln(avg income per capita in the township) -0.039* -0.034* 
 (0.021) (0.019) 
Average schooling in the township -0.022* -0.014 
 (0.011) (0.010) 
Number of observations 6,334 6,334 
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.138 
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Table 4. Parent Matchmaking, Love, and Money  
 Harmony Log(couple joint income) 
 OLS OLS  2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS 
rural 0.068 -0.015  0.083 0.011 -0.007 0.169** 
 (0.172) (0.139)  (0.244) (0.043) (0.037) (0.074) 
parent matchmaker -0.105** -0.095**  -1.700** -0.002 0.001 0.448** 
 (0.048) (0.048)  (0.784) (0.019) (0.019) (0.206) 
parent matchmaker * rural 0.055 0.064  0.631 -0.043 -0.042 -0.865*** 
 (0.060) (0.060)  (0.787) (0.031) (0.031) (0.232) 
ln(age) 0.182** 0.132*  0.269** 0.174*** 0.161*** 0.184*** 
 (0.088) (0.080)  (0.107) (0.039) (0.038) (0.048) 
Schooling 0.003 0.002  -0.003 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Mother schooling 0.001 0.000  -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Father schooling -0.001 -0.001  -0.003 0.004* 0.004** 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Communist Party  0.024 0.023  0.022 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.075*** 
 (0.031) (0.030)  (0.038) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
Ln(township income per  0.051 0.045  0.014 0.973*** 0.971*** 0.956*** 
      capita) (0.037) (0.034)  (0.033) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) 
Avg township schooling -0.008 -0.023  -0.043* -0.006 -0.010 -0.017** 
 (0.032) (0.023)  (0.024) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Religion, ethnicity dummies No Yes  Yes No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 6,050 6,050  6,050 6,334 6,334 6,334 
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.015   0.845 0.846  
Cragg-Donald Wald F stat    31.6   29.8 
Kleibergen-Paap Walk rk F stat    18.2   16.9 
*, **, and ***: statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. White-corrected standard errors clustered at the township level  in parentheses 
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Table 5. Parent Matchmaking and Wife Schooling and Earning 
 Wife Schooling Ln(Wife Income) 
 OLS OLS 2SLS  OLS OLS 2SLS  
rural 0.447 0.272 1.944***  0.223 0.165 0.531  
 (0.284) (0.321) (0.675)  (0.253) (0.261) (0.389)  
Parent matched -0.374*** -0.360*** 2.383  -0.072** -0.065** -5.517***  
 (0.116) (0.115) (1.717)  (0.029) (0.029) (1.273)  
Parent Matched * Rural -0.146 -0.141 -7.087***  -0.018 -0.017 2.102  
 (0.155) (0.151) (2.114)  (0.050) (0.051) (1.303)  
Other controls as in column (1) of 
Table 5 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Religion and ethnic dummies No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes  
Number of observations 6,334 6,334 6,334  6,154 6,154 6,154  
Adjusted R2 0.537 0.538 0.344  0.390 0.394 -4.175  
Cragg-Donald Wald F stat   29.8    22.9  
Kleibergen-Paap Walk rk F stat   16.9    14.2  
Note.  *, **, and ***: statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. White-corrected standard errors clustered at the township 
 level in parentheses. 
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Table 6. Parental Matchmaking and Wife Submissiveness 
 Wife Submissiveness 
Woman Career Not 
Important 
No Good Male Friend  Cannot Reject Sex  
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS  OLS 2SLS  
Rural -0.215 -0.534* -0.028 -0.260** 0.003 -0.120  -0.161* -0.123  
 (0.150) (0.304) (0.054) (0.102) (0.085) (0.163)  (0.089) (0.145)  
Parent matched 0.061 2.509*** 0.028 0.071 0.035 1.478***  -0.002 0.925**  
 (0.037) (0.733) (0.018) (0.185) (0.024) (0.460)  (0.023) (0.402)  
Parent matched  0.002 -0.456 -0.028 0.693*** 0.021 -0.430  0.005 -0.665  
       * rural (0.055) (0.847) (0.028) (0.235) (0.034) (0.512)  (0.029) (0.426)  
Other controls as in 
column (1) of 
Table 5 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Religion and ethnic 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
N obs. 6,256 6,256 6,334 6,334 6,298 6,298  6,268 6,268  
Adjusted R2 0.133 -0.984 0.055 -0.493 0.083 -0.959  0.040 -0.178  
Cragg-Donald Wald 
F stat 
 28.1  29.8  28.9   27.9  
Kleibergen-Paap 
Walk rk F stat 
 16.2  16.9  16.1   16.3  
Note.  *, **, and ***: statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. White-corrected standard errors clustered at the township level in parentheses. 
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Table 7. Parent Matchmaking and Reward for Providing Old Age Support 
 Reward for providing old age support 
 OLS OLS 2SLS  
rural 0.061 0.072 -0.057  
 (0.089) (0.085) (0.140)  
Parent matched 0.022 0.020 0.848**  
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.418)  
Parent matched * rural 0.037 0.032 -0.028  
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.451)  
Other controls as in column (1) of Table 5 Yes Yes Yes  
Religion and ethnic dummies No Yes Yes  
Number of observations 6,300 6,300 6,300  
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.024 -0.456  
Cragg-Donald Wald F stat   37.9  
Kleibergen-Paap Walk rk F stat   18.2  
Note.  *, **, and ***: statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. White-corrected standard errors clustered at the 
 township level in parentheses. 
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Table 8. Parent Matchmaking and Number of Children 
 The number of children Dummy =1 if three amatnd more children 
 OLS OLS  2SLS OLS OLS  2SLS 
rural 0.750** 0.856**  -0.497 -0.012 0.032  -0.535*** 
 (0.347) (0.345)  (0.556) (0.103) (0.089)  (0.175) 
parent matched 0.009 -0.001  2.373 -0.009 -0.013  -1.323* 
 (0.047) (0.045)  (2.154) (0.013) (0.013)  (0.770) 
parent matched * rural 0.188*** 0.184***  3.150 0.080*** 0.080***  2.655*** 
 (0.065) (0.062)  (2.164) (0.022) (0.021)  (0.785) 
Other controls as in column (1) 
of Table 5 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Religion and ethnic dummies No Yes  Yes No Yes  Yes 
Number of observations 6,334 6,334  6,334 6,334 6,334  6,334 
Adjusted R2 0.299 0.305  -3.797 0.120 0.127  -2.200 
Cragg-Donald Wald F stat    29.8   29.8 
Kleibergen-Paap Walk rk F stat    16.9   16.9 
Note.  *, **, and ***: statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. White-corrected standard errors clustered at the township level in parentheses. 
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Appendix B: The first stage regressions 
 Parent matchmaking Parent matchmaking * rural 
 coef/se coef/se 
Parent Matchmaking Norm 0.673*** -0.054 
 (0.145) (0.078) 
Parent Matchmaking Norm * rural -0.055 0.694*** 
 (0.173) (0.122) 
rural 0.034 0.050 
 (0.082) (0.078) 
ln(husband's age) 0.037 0.035 
 (0.042) (0.039) 
ln(husband schooling) -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
husband's mother's schooling 0.001 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.002) 
husband's father's schooling -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
husband being a communist party member -0.018 -0.018 
 (0.015) (0.012) 
ln(avg township income) -0.018 -0.019 
 (0.017) (0.014) 
avg township schooling -0.008 -0.010 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
religion & ethnicity dummies yes yes 
F-stat for excluded Ivs 13.300 18.700 
Number of observations 6,334 6,334 
Adjusted R2 0.147 0.305 
 
